the parties are free to disregard the jury's proposed settlement amount. The use of SJT is not controversial when both parties consent. But recently, several judges-understandably eager to reduce their backlog of cases-have required unwilling parties to attend SJTs on pain of sanction and even criminal contempt.' It is this kind of judicial pressure that this Comment examines.
This Comment discusses the use of mandatory SJTs in the federal courts and argues that SJTs should not be forced upon unwilling litigants. Section I examines the SJT process and the current controversy over mandatory SJTs. Section II argues that mandatory SJTs are not supported by either the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the intent of those who drafted them, and that at least one provision of the rules appears to preclude the use of mandatory SJTs. Section III evaluates the effects of mandatory SJTs on other aspects of our judicial process, specifically the quality of justice the parties receive in an SJT. This analysis suggests that mandatory SJTs may lead to inaccurate results and an unwarranted pressure on litigants to settle.
I. THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL

A. Description of the Summary Jury Trial
The SJT was created by Judge Thomas D. Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio." It is designed for cases where the parties are having difficulty reaching settlement because each overestimates the strength of his own case or, equivalently, underestimates the strength of his opponent's.
7 SJTs reduce this "mutual optimism" by providing the parties with more information about the strength of their cases before proceeding to trial.' SJT's also clarify issues at an earlier stage, thus making a subsequent trial more efficient.9 judge often allows the parties to meet with the jurors to discuss their impressions of the case. 20 Voluntary SJT has been used most frequently in Judge Lambros's Northern District of Ohio, 2 but has spread to other federal and state courts. 22 Several federal district courts explicitly provide for SJT in their local rules. The Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky are illustrative. Their joint rules provide that " [a] judge may, in his discretion, set any civil case for SJT or other alternative method of dispute resolution. ' 2 Other courts provide for SJT through standing orders. 2 4
B. Differences Between the Summary Jury Trial and Other Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution
The term "alternative dispute resolution" has long been used to describe techniques that assist parties in settling their disputes out of court. SJTs are often grouped with the more "traditional" ADR mechanisms of the mini-trial, arbitration, and "rent-ajudge," or private judging. 25 But significant differences exist. Disputes, 69 Judicature 286, 289-90 (1986); and Lambros, 29 Vill L Rev at 1377 (cited in note 4).
21 See Caldwell v Ohio Power Co., 710 F Supp 194, 202 (N D Ohio 1989) ; Negin v City of Mentor, Ohio, 601 F Supp 1502 , 1505 (N D Ohio 1985 ; Rocco Wine Distributors, Inc. v Pleasant Valley Wine Co., 596 F Supp 617, 621 (N D Ohio 1984) ; Compressed Gas Corp. v United States Steel Corp., 857 F2d 346, 348 (6th Cir 1988); Erskine v Consolidated Rail Corp., 814 F2d 266, 268 (6th Cir 1987) . See generally, M. Daniel Jacoubovitch and Carl M. Moore, Summary Jury Trials in the Northern District of Ohio (Federal Judicial Center, 1982) .
22 See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v General Elec. Co., 117 FRD 597, 599 (S D Ohio 1987) , aff'd 854 F2d 900 (6th Cir 1988), cert denied 109 S Ct 1171 (1989); Smart v Simonson, 1987 US Dist LEXIS 11079 (N D III; December 1, 1987); Lockhart v Patel, 115 FRD 44, 45 (E D Ky 1987) . At least two state courts have used SJT. See Bixler v J.C. Penney Co., 376 NW2d 209, 214 (Minn 1985) ; Estate of Nibert, 1987 WL 102420 (Ohio App 1987 The mini-trial is a voluntary process in which each party's attorney makes a brief presentation of its case to the litigants-toplevel management officials in cases involving corporations. 2 " A "neutral advisor" (usually an attorney or former judge) acts as moderator, and at the conclusion of the presentations tells how she thinks the case would be decided at an actual trial. The parties then sit down without attorneys present and attempt to resolve the dispute. If the parties fail to reach a compromise, the neutral advisor may issue a non-binding opinion discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' positions and predicting the outcome of a courtroom trial.1 7
The SJT also resembles arbitration, the best known of the ADR mechanisms. 2 The two forms of arbitration-court-annexed and private-generally use the same legal rules that govern ordinary litigation. 29 Arbitration hearings are abbreviated, adversarial, and informal. Litigants dissatisfied with the result in court-annexed arbitration, like those dissatisfied with an SJT verdict, have a right to trial de novo in a district court. 30 In private arbitration, however, parties usually do not have this right: they often have previously agreed to accept the results of the arbitration. The SJT also resembles one of the newest ADR methods: "rent-a-judge" or private judging.
3 2 In "rent-a-judge" trials, the parties agree to conduct a private trial before a hired referee, usually a retired judge, and to be bound to some extent by the judge's decision. The parties sometimes agree that the judge will file a report with a federal trial court that may be used to enter judgment.
(cited in note 3). The use of SJT parallels the growing federal court practice of using magistrates to aid in the settlement process. County, Ill.4 The plaintiff in Strandell had filed a civil rights action against the county. Chief Judge Foreman, observing that a full jury trial would take five or six weeks to complete and that the parties were "poles apart in terms of settlement," ordered the parties to appear at a non-binding SJT in an effort to settle the action. 5 The plaintiff's attorney objected to the order, maintaining that it would force him to reveal his trial strategy and case preparation prior to an actual trial on the merits. 3 6 The court held the plaintiff's attorney in criminal contempt for his refusal to participate in an SJT.
Judge Foreman gave three bases for his authority to compel an SJT. First, he cited a report of the 1984 Judicial Conference adopting a resolution endorsing the experimental use of SJTs. He pointed out that an initial draft of the resolution had limited the Conference's endorsement of SJTs to cases where the parties consented to its use, but that this language had been omitted without explanation from the final draft of the resolution. Second, Judge Foreman relied on Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that settlement may be discussed at a pretrial conference. He found that although Rule 16 was not designed to force a settlement on unwilling parties, it does permit courts "to order the litigants to engage in a process which will enhance the possibility of fruitful negotiations. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the order of criminal contempt, holding that a trial court lacks the power to impose sanctions upon an attorney who refuses to appear at an SJT. 4 1 The court reasoned that while the pretrial conference provisions of Rule 16 were intended to foster the use of settlement, they were not intended to authorize a mandatory SJT. 42 Neither the language of Rule 16 nor the intent of its drafters permits a trial judge to "force unwilling parties into settlement negotiations. '4 Since Strandell, several district courts have rejected the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and imposed SJTs on unwilling litigants. In Arabian American Oil Co. v Scarfone, the Middle District of Florida concluded that the "obvious purpose and aim of Rule 16" is to permit courts to use any process, including compulsory SJT, in furtherance of "intelligent and effective case management and disposition. ' facilitate settlement of the case. 51 Rule 16(c) states that "settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures" are appropriate topics of conversation at a pretrial conference. 2 Given that a trial judge can order participants to attend pretrial conference in order to encourage settlement through extrajudicial procedures, it is not unreasonable to infer, as so many courts and commentators have, that a judge can require a mandatory SJT.
There are, however, persuasive textual arguments that Rule 16 rejects the mandatory SJT by negative implication. Although Rule 16(a) allows a judge to direct the parties to attend a pretrial conference for the purpose of settlement, it does not give courts express power to mandate any procedure for settlement purposes. Furthermore, Rule 16(c) states that the conference participants "may consider" the use of extrajudicial procedures, not that the court "may direct" such procedures. The use of the precatory "may consider" in the same rule as the mandatory "may direct"
suggests that the drafters intended to give judges less power to compel extrajudicial proceedings than to compel appearance at a pretrial conference.
In addition, Rule 16(c)(7) authorizes discussion at a pretrial conference of "extrajudicial" procedures for exploring settlement. Most commentators agree that SJTs are not extrajudicial. 3 They are "conducted inside the courtroom of a federal courthouse, before an Article III judge, and with jurors selected from the court's master jury wheel who are paid from congressionally apportioned funds." ' 5 4 It is unclear whether Rule 16 addresses ADR tech-
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the action ... and; (5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
5' Rule 16(c) states:
The participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to . . . niques at all. 5 But if it does, the presence of the word "extrajudicial" suggests that the drafters intended to sanction only ADR methods outside the courtroom, such as mediation and arbitration.
6
The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 16 provide only a little more information about the purpose and intent of the rule. The purpose of subdivision (c) was to improve the planning and management of litigation by expanding the 1938 conception of subjects that may be discussed at a pretrial conference. 57 Clause (7), for example, was added to recognize that "it has become commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences" and to facilitate settlement at an early stage of the litigation. 8 Along with other notes to Rule 16, these unambiguously "pro-settlement" statements have led some to conclude that the Rule's primary purpose is to broaden a judge's pretrial management powers. 5 9 It is erroneous, however, to read the Advisory Committee Notes as if they solely encourage settlement, for they also reflect concern for parties not wishing to settle. The Committee noted, for example:
Although it is not the purpose of Rule 16(c)(7) to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants, it is believed that providing a neutral forum for discussing the subject might foster it ... [t]he rule does not make settlement conferences mandatory because they would be a waste of time in many cases.
0
In addition to specifically refusing to require courts to conduct settlement conferences, the Advisory Committee also refused to require courts to hold pretrial conferences. 1 Moreover, although the Committee's comments endorse settlement broadly, they also frequently refer to the more modest goals of removing impediments to settlement and defining the issues. 6 2 The Committee's goal of providing a "neutral forum" for settlement discussions indicates that it merely intended to give judges the opportunity to discuss settlement with the parties at the pretrial conference should they so desire. In other words, the drafters' primary concern may have been to resolve any doubts as to whether settlement is an appropriate subject of pretrial discussion. 3 The pretrial conference provision appears to be primarily informational, not coercive in nature. 6 4 Rule 16 certainly gives judges power to do more than just provide a room (their chambers) for the parties to discuss settlement. It is quite plausible that Rule 16 gives judges the power to ensure that the parties have thought seriously about settlement, but stops short of conferring power to require the parties to take specific steps towards settlement. More specifically, under Rule 16 a judge may convene a pretrial conference, question the parties on steps taken toward settlement, ascertain what additional steps they plan to take, ensure that the parties have considered key facts in the case that might affect the decision whether to settle, and help the parties settle the case if they are open to compromise-maybe even suggesting a voluntary SJT as an innovative way of exploring settlement. 6 5 In other words, the judge can ensure that the parties have seriously considered such negotiations, but cannot require that they enter into them.
This reading of Rule 16 is consistent with the drafters' intent not "to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants," s and recognizes that litigants may have good reasons not to settle. For example, a party may wish to reap the benefits of res judicata, which precludes other parties from bringing future claims that are identical to the present claim. This requires a court judgment; a favorable settlement will not suffice. The drafters of Rule 16 surely respected the fact that litigants have absolutely no duty to bargain ' See FRCP 16(c) Advisory Committee Notes (1983), stating that Rule 16(c)(1) was designed to "confirm the court's power to identify the ... real issues prior to trial, thereby saving time and expense for everyone."
6' See FRCP 16(a) Advisory Committee Notes (1983), stating that "the amendment explicitly recognizes some of the objectives of pretrial conferences and the powers that many courts already have assumed." " See Maatman, 21 John Marshall L Rev at 472 (cited in note 10), citing J.F. Edwards Const. Co. v Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F2d 1318 , 1323 (7th Cir 1976 .
65 See Provine, Settlement Strategies at 71 (cited in note 15) (reporting that some federal judges try to "sell" the litigants on the virtues of SJT).
61 FRCP 16(c)(7) Advisory Committee Notes (1983).
over settlement, and may insist on "their day in court.
67
If compelling an SJT is analogous to convening a conference to discuss the possibility of settlement, then the authority to do so might fit within the boundaries of judicial intervention under Rule 16(a). But the analogy does not hold. The parties in an SJT are submitting the facts of their dispute to a neutral arbitrator for his non-binding decision. The outcome of the SJT-the amount of the "jury verdict"-almost certainly will be used by one of the parties as a basis for a settlement offer. Taking steps to put a "dollar value" on a case surpasses mere discussion about settlement negotiations; it approximates a settlement negotiation itself. 6 8 A judge who requires an appearance at an SJT is forcing the party to enter into what corresponds to settlement negotiations. This practice was rejected by the drafters of Rule 16.
Finally, interpreting Rule 16 to authorize judges solely to facilitate and not to coerce settlement is supported by subsequent congressional proposals to amend the rule. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1986,9 as passed by the Senate, would have required attorneys to advise their clients of ADR options and to file notice with the court certifying that the clients were properly notified. 0 The House version was similar. 71 The proposed legislation expressly provided that an attorney "shall . . . advise the party of the existence and availability of alternative dispute resolution options, including extra-judicial proceedings such 67 See National Ass'n of Government Employees, Inc. v National Federation of Fed- as mini-trials, and... court supervised arbitration, and SJT proceedings." 2 However, the proposed legislation did not give judges the option of making an SJT mandatory. In fact, the proposed bill stated that each attorney must "indicat[e] whether his client will agree to one or more of the alternative dispute resolution techniques, '73 and provided that the court could enter an order only "[i]n the event all parties to an action agree to proceed with one or more" of the procedures. 4 Thus, even when Congress expressly considered promoting ADR techniques through Rule 16, it proposed a system that would be informational (the attorney need only attest that she has informed the client of ADR techniques) and not coercive. If the legislation is passed, Congress will leave the ultimate choice to the parties, without any judicial interference." s 2. Rules 83 and 1.
Rule 16 is most directly applicable to the question of mandatory SJTs, but some courts also rely upon Rules 83 and 1. Rule 83 gives a federal district court the power to "make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.
1 7 6 The rule is not an independent source of federal judicial power; it conditions the validity of a local court rule upon its conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole. Courts have held local rules invalid under Rule 83 if they conflict with the language or intent of one of the federal rules.
7 7 Thus, a local rule need not conflict with the plain words of a federal rule in order to be impermissible under Rule 83.
Similar reasoning can be used to reject as a justification for 72 S 2038 § 3(a) (cited in note 69). Note that the proposed bill includes the minitrial-but not the SJT or court-supervised arbitration-as an example of an extra-judicial proceeding (the phrase "extra-judicial proceedings such as mini-trials" is separated from "summary jury trial proceedings"). See text accompanying notes 53-56.
S 2038 § 3(a) (cited in note 69) (emphasis added). Id (emphasis added). 7' The proposal to amend Rule 16 can be classified as "post-enactment legislative history." The weight to be given post-enactment legislative history is somewhat controversial. mandatory SJTs Rule l's call for the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. '7' The interpretations of some courts and commentators notwithstanding, the word "speedy" is not necessarily the most important in Rule 1, to be read to trump the remaining language of the rule-and the specific dictates of the eighty-five rules that follow. 9 The stated purpose of the federal rules is to promote justice. 80 One could even argue that the placement of the word "just" before the word "speedy" in Rule 1 indicates the drafters' intent that justice prevail over speed. In any event, even if Rule 1 gives courts the discretion to resolve cases justly and speedily, the trial judge must use his discretion wisely. 8 This means that he cannot ignore the context of a federal rule or apply it without considering its relation to the other federal rules. 2 Thus, if Rule 16 does not give courts the power to compel SJT, Rule 1, like Rule 83, should not be used to achieve the same end. 8
Rule 68.
Rule 68 is the only provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that penalizes a party for failing to settle a case. It provides that if a defendant makes a timely offer of settlement and the plaintiff rejects it, and if the plaintiff later obtains a judgment for less than the offered settlement amount, the plaintiff cannot recover post-offer attorney's fees from the defendant. 4 At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued .... An offer not accepted [within 10 days] shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. Rule 68 by its terms does not apply in cases where the defendant prevails. See generally then, provides an element of compulsion that Rule 16 lacks: the rule tells plaintiffs that resisting reasonable settlement offers may be costly.
The question is how far this policy of encouraging settlement extends. It can be argued that Rule 68 indicates a broad endorsement of settlement even in cases where it does not expressly apply, and that the rule sanctions mandatory SJT because it encourages settlement. 8 5 But Rule 68 can also be read as a denial of a federal court's power to compel an SJT. This is evident from the limited scope of the rule itself. The Rule 68 cost-shifting apparatus does not apply to every case that is litigated in the federal courts; it applies only to offers by defendants, and allows shifting of attorney's fees only when it is provided for by the underlying statute. 8 6 Courts should not extend the policy behind a legal rule beyond the scope provided in the rule itself. 87 Mandatory SJTs clearly lie outside the explicit authority conferred by Rule 68. In fact, when courts impose mandatory SJT they may even contravene Congress's intent, extending the pro-settlement policy beyond the boundaries set by the rule. As the Supreme Court recently recognized, "it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law." ' 88 Rule 68, then, becomes a powerful argument against the proposition that mandatory SJT is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The drafters of the federal rules provided in Rule 68 a certain amount of incentive for parties to settle; they went no further.
In addition, Rule 68's expression of preference for settlement furnishes no basis for inferring approval of judicially imposed settlement proceedings. Rule 68 is self-executing, and does not confer any power on a judge. 8 9 Thus, it is somewhat troublesome to read Rule 68 as a justification for mandatory SJTs. In short, although Rule 68 does encourage settlement, it is a limited rule with a careDelta Air Lines, Inc. v August, 450 US 346 (1981 fully defined domain. Like Rules 16, 83, and 1, Rule 68 does not give a federal judge the power to compel SJTs. Without the authority of the federal rules, a judge must rely on some other source for such a power.
B. The Inherent Powers of a Federal Court
Some courts and commentators base a trial judge's power to compel, attendance at SJTs on a court's "inherent power to manage its docket." 90 These "inherent powers" are different from those expressly provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and are traditionally thought to derive "from the very nature of the judicial system." 9 1
The Seventh Circuit recently stated, in a sharply divided en banc opinion in G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v Joseph Oat Corp., 2 that federal courts have broad inherent power to manage their dockets. The court held that even if Rule 16 does not explicitly authorize a district court to order litigants represented by counsel to appear personally at a pretrial conference, a trial court may issue such an order on the basis of its inherent powers. 9 The court described the inherent power to take action in a procedural context as "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." 9" As conceived by the Seventh Circuit, courts' inherent powers existed prior to enactment of the federal rules, and under the common law enabled courts to make rules for themselves. 5 The federal rules merely carved out and codified those inherent powers devoted to rulemaking. 9 6 Those areas that were not codified, the ar- , 14 (1940) , rejecting a defendant's arguments that powers the parties had before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are retained undiminished. The Court indicated that the Federal Rules erased the old eq-gument goes, still exist undiminished and may be exercised to the extent they remain in harmony with the federal rules. 9 In short, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not completely describe the powers of the federal courts. 8 Though the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of some inherent powers in the courts, the scope of the inherent powers not covered by the Federal Rules is traditionally viewed as quite narrow. These remaining powers grow out of well-acknowledged historical roots and apply only in "narrowly defined circumstances." 9 A court's inherent powers are limited to those "necessary to the exercise of all others," 100 necessary for a court "to preserve its own existence," 10 ' and "absolutely essential" for the functioning of the judiciary. 0 2 They encompass "an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms 'court' and 'judicial power.' "103 Most of the courts invoking inherent powers have done so in order to sanction those who abuse the judicial process. 1 0 4 There are at least three reasons why the inherent powers are construed so narrowly. First, the powers are very difficult to define. Even the Heileman majority conceded that a court's inherent powers are undefined and "not frequently documented."' 0 5 In addition, uity powers of the parties and recast them in codified form. Finally, there may be constitutional limitations on the scope of inherent powers. Even the power to sanction parties for contempt rests rather uneasily upon the provisions of Article 111,107 and extensions of the inherent powers beyond the power to sanction must be viewed with suspicion.
Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized in Heileman and Strandell, a court's inherent power, like its Rule 83 power to make local court rules, is limited to those cases where the power sought to be exercised does not conflict with the other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 08 In crafting the rules, Congress and the Supreme Court carefully balanced the need for efficiency against the need to protect individual rights. 1 0 9 District courts cannot use inherent authority to formulate procedural rules at odds with the Constitution or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 " 0 Such exercise of unspecified powers "would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.""' dure: Some Questions About Power, 11 Hofstra L Rev 997, 1004 (1983 . 100 See Roadway Express, 447 US at 764. 107 See Young, 481 US at 816-17 (Scalia concurring) (arguing that judicial prosecution of parties who disregard court orders is not an exercise of the Article III judicial power to act as a neutral adjudicator). But see In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F2d 1254 , 1261 (2d Cir 1984 , stating that courts must have the power to protect themselves from vexatious conduct that impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions, and cannot be dependent upon another branch of government for that power. Courts sometimes attribute the authority to compel SJT to a novel inherent power deriving from "necessity" or convenience.
2 But the Supreme Court has rebuffed attempts by district court judges to exercise wide-ranging power just because it is convenient to do so. In Thermtron Products, Inc. v Hermansdorfer," 3 for example, the federal district judge had unilaterally remanded the case back to state court, citing his crowded docket and the fact that there was not enough time to try the case. " 4 The Supreme Court held that the federal judge erred in remanding the action on grounds not listed in 28 USC § 1447(c).
11 5 The Court rejected arguments that the trial court's docket was too crowded to keep the case, reasoning that "an otherwise properly removed action may no more be remanded because the district court considers itself too busy to try it than an action properly filed in the federal court in the first instance may be dismissed or referred to state courts for such reason." ' " 6 Thus, arguments relying upon a court's inherent powers must recognize the limitations of those powers. It strains credulity to assert that the power to compel parties to take steps in settling a case is indispensable or "fundamental to the essence of a court."
Concerns of convenience and efficiency do not justify creation of a new inherent power that is undefined, shielded from democratic control, and unsanctioned by the congressional-judicial balancing process of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the inherent powers doctrine does not justify mandatory SJTs.
C. Judicial Conference Approval of Mandatory SJTs
To bolster their authority to impose mandatory SJTs, a few "' Eash, 757 F2d at 563.
423 US 336 (1976).
"I Id at 339. 115 Id at 345. 28 USC § 1447(c) (1982) provides in part: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case.... ."
6 Thermtron, 423 US at 344. As noted, the lower court in Thermtron based its remand on crowded dockets and lack of trial time. This reasoning parallels Strandell, where the trial court based its decision to compel an SJT in part on an interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 USC § 3161 et seq (1982). See text at notes 39-40. The Strandell court failed to notice, however, that other factors may contribute to the slow movement of the civil docket, such as the rules of discovery but the mere fact that there are some things that slow down the civil docket does not suggest mandatory SJT is a logical necessity. Furthermore, the drafters of the Speedy Trial Act must have been aware that it would delay civil litigation; their failure to provide for an analogous speedy trial act for civil cases suggests they did not find the Speedy Trial Act's effect on the civil docket a serious matter.
" Eash, 757 F2d at 562.
courts have pointed to modifications in the initial draft of a report of the 1984 Judicial Conference. The draft endorsed SJTs, but "only with the voluntary consent of the parties."" ' 8 In the final draft of the resolution, however, the "voluntary consent" language was dropped without explanation." 9 The trial courts in both McKay and Strandell found this omission persuasive, inferring that the conference viewed mandatory SJTs as consistent with the federal rules. 2 0
The Judicial Conference has never issued an explicit endorsement of mandatory SJTs, however, and the McKay and Strandell courts overlooked one of the most plausible explanations for the omission: the conference simply did not wish to take a position on the touchy topic of mandatory SJTs. Another explanation for the omission of language in a later draft is lack of confidence in the clarity of the omitted language. Neither court explored these possibilities.
The views of a committee of the Judicial Conference, moreover, are only persuasive and not binding authority.' 2 ' Other judicial committees have rejected mandatory SJTs.' 2 ' Judicial Conference pronouncements have no binding force because the handful of judges participating in the conference are not promulgating rules. Thus, their comments cannot be given the same weight as comments by the drafters of Rule 16.123 Even if the Judicial Conference were acting in an administrative rulemaking capacity, the Supreme Court has held that the conclusions of judges acting in a rulemaking capacity are not entitled to the same deference as their 18 The original draft provided that "the Judicial Conference endorses the use of summary jury trials, only with the voluntary consent of the parties, as a potentially effective means of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of lengthy civil jury trials." Report of Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System Agenda G-13 4 (GPO, 1984) . decisions on questions of law. 24 Therefore, the conference's views are no more persuasive than a trial judge's decision to impose an SJT in a real case. In short, the Judicial Conference resolution is at most a guide to what a handful of respected judges think about the question.
III. MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY TRIAL AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
An SJT is not a costless procedure. Indeed, SJT imposes monetary costs on litigants, as well as costs in the form of pressure to settle for the amount of the SJT "verdict." If the SJT yields inaccurate results, such costs are unwarranted. This section briefly examines the overall quality and effectiveness of mandatory SJTs.
A. Lack of Evidentiary and Procedural Safeguards in the SJT
One danger in forcing parties to appear at an SJT is that the result may rest on inaccurate, or at least inadequately tested, facts. Several factors contribute to this danger: (1) the usual rules of evidence may not apply at an SJT; (2) witnesses are not permitted; and (3) voir dire is greatly abbreviated. This section examines each factor in turn.
Where, as in our adversarial system, the parties are responsible for finding and presenting facts to the court, a critical control mechanism is the ability of the opposing party to challenge the facts placed into evidence. But at least one court has stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in an SJT. 2 6 If taken to an extreme, this lack of evidentiary protection could result in the introduction of irrelevant evidence.
rates the basic rules of evidence, he discourages formal objections. 1 2 8 One attorney who participated in an SJT voiced concern over his inability to object:
The inability to object.., gave the plaintiffs carte blanche to present whatever arguments and versions of the facts they chose, regardless of whether they would have been admissible at trial. Plaintiffs ' [presentation] bore no resemblance to courtroom testimony. They had the look and tone of investigative journalism and concentrated on creating emotion rather than addressing the facts ....
Rebuttal time also gave the plaintiffs.. . an obvious advantage, since they could have the last word without fear of objection or surrebuttal. 1 29
Thus, even though a conscientious judge may be on the lookout for attempts to introduce patently inadmissible evidence, the flexibility and informality exalted by proponents of the SJT make possible serious transgressions of the rules of evidence. When evidence is introduced at an SJT that would be inadmissable at a regular trial, the results a "jury" reaches based on that information are suspect. 1 30 To be sure, the parties may discount their faith in the jury's recommendation to reflect the fact that the jury did not get the "true picture." If this happens, however, the SJT loses some or most of its value as an informationproducing mechanism. This problem could be avoided, of course, by requiring that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply at all SJTs, but such a requirement would only make the SJT more complex and would probably make the process longer and less desirable as a voluntary means of alternative dispute resolution.
A second factor leading to inaccurate results is the prohibition of witnesses at SJTs.' 3 ' Instead, attorneys may summarize anticipated "witness testimony" from reports or depositions. 132 These statements cannot be challenged by cross-examination, and the SJT jury cannot evaluate the demeanor or credibility of the witnesses; consequently, two of the most valued methods of discerning the truth at trial are removed. 33 In cases where witness credibility Lambros, 103 FRD at 471 (cited in note 6). 129 Clifford J. Zatz, Summary Jury Trial: The Settlement of a Toxic Tort Case, 2 Toxics L Rptr 929, 933-34 (1988) .
130 See Maatman, A third factor that could result in inaccurate SJT results is abbreviated voir dire. In Judge Lambros's original formulation of the SJT, only ten potential jurors are selected, and counsel are permitted only two challenges each. 135 The attorneys rest their challenges only on the "basic information" contained in questionnaires that each potential juror completes. These questionnaires are normally prepared by the court." 3 6 Sometimes voir dire takes only 15 minutes.
1 37 Unless the parties are given some role in selecting the questions that will be asked on this form, they are not as free to elicit information from the decision makers as they would have been in the context of a regular jury trial. In short, although hailed as a method of "relieving counsel and the court from having to obtain the information from each potential juror during voir dire,"' 35 the abbreviated process of juror selection severely limits the amount of information available to the attorneys about the "jurors" who hear the case.
B. Effects of the Mandatory SJT on the Unwilling Litigant
As the above section indicates, the jury presiding over an SJT draws its conclusions from a record that is composed largely of claims untested by the opposing party. Proponents of the mandatory SJT may argue that we need not worry about the lack of fidelity to the protections of a full jury trial, and any resulting unwarranted pressure to settle, since a party is free to reject the advisory SJT verdict and pursue the case to a full trial with the usual evidentiary and procedural safeguards. These arguments, however, overestimate the parties' "freedom" to ignore the SJT verdict. An unwilling party may in fact be under great pressure to settle for the amount of the SJT verdict. Mandatory SJTs also create practical difficulties for parties unwilling to settle, such as the rev ed 1971) (discussing an American Bar Association study showing that without adversary presentation of facts, judges and jurors have a tendency to reach conclusions at an early stage of the litigation and adhere to those conclusions even though conflicting considerations later develop).
, loss of strategic options and the additional cost of preparing for an SJT.
It is usually the case that one party ("A") will be under mounting pressure to settle by the end of the SJT. The judge may be pushing for settlement on the basis of the jury's findings in an SJT. A's opponent may also be making settlement offers based on the results of the SJT-offers which, if rejected, may preclude A from recovering post-offer costs under Rule 68.181 The judge's perceptions, the opponent's offer, and even A's modified opinion of his own case, however, are based on possibly erroneous evaluations of the strength of A's case. Thus, the pressure on A may be unwarranted.
The potential inaccuracies of an SJT are especially troublesome for corporate litigants because an SJT verdict that is substantial relative to a firm's assets may be material information that must be disclosed to shareholders. 140 This danger further pressures the firm to settle rather than continue on to trial. In this setting, "the summary trial becomes the real trial rather than just an aid to settlement. It is a very cheap real trial and that is all to the good, but it may also be an unreliable method of adjudicating a substantial dispute."''
Parties that resist these pressures to settle face other disadvantages as well. Mandatory SJTs may prevent each party from keeping its strategies quiet until an actual trial on the merits. It is true that courts usually require the parties to exchange witness lists and summaries of testimony before trial. Since a summary jury trial is based on facts disclosed by discovery and is meant to be a synopsis of the actual trial, it is hard to see how anything would be disclosed by a summary jury trial that would not be disclosed before the real trial anyway. Judges therefore usually doubt attorneys' claims that there are still "secrets" that legitimately can be kept until the day of trial. Although the advent of liberal discovery rules has outmoded the "sporting" theory of litigation, 1 4 2 an attorney may still keep some "secrets" prior to trial. In fact, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affirmatively protect some elements of a trial. Rule 26(b)(3), for example, protects against disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions and legal strategies.' An SJT exposes all of this information. If the parties do not settle after an SJT, the attorneys will go to trial with a new understanding of the case, and new information about their opponent's trial strategy.
1 4 4 This information would ordinarily have been protected prior to trial by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, not every judge waits for the completion of discovery to order an SJT. This poses two problems. First, it may increase the inaccuracy of the SJT "verdict" if the parties are not fully prepared or informed or about the case. Second, it may reward the lazy or slow party at the expense of the diligent one. In Strandell, for example, the plaintiffs' attorneys had engaged in voluminous discovery before the court ordered an SJT; the defendants had done virtually none. 4 5 The trial court had at one point denied the defendant's motion to compel production of the statements of several of the plaintiffs' witnesses on the grounds of privilege.1 46 This left the plaintiffs with legitimate "secrets" even after pretrial discovery. But the mandatory SJT that the court ordered later would have effectively eliminated the statements' secrecy and privilege, since the plaintiffs would have been under a great deal of pressure to present her best case-which necessarily included the privileged statements. One of the plaintiffs' attorneys described this "Hobson's choice" as follows:
[The] order compelling participation in the [SJT] placed plaintiffs' counsel in a position of adopting one line of strategy different from that of a full trial on the merits. Plaintiffs' counsel would have had to confine their presentation to conclusory arguments of the defendants' alleged liability in order to avoid the risk of irreparable harm and injury to their case, which would be caused by revealing the privileged witness statements in the summary jury trial. Since defense counsel had failed to undertake any discovery with respect to witnesses, defense counsel therefore would become the recipient of the specifics of testimony in the [SJT] that they had not bothered to investigate.
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Even if discovery is complete, an SJT aids a party who has done shoddy discovery, as the defendants in Strandell apparently did.
Finally, supporters of mandatory SJTs often overlook the additional monetary costs that SJTs impose on the parties. When settlement fails, a litigant forced to endure an SJT before getting a "day in court" must prepare twice for one trial.
14 This increases the costs of the eventual trial, and may persuade some parties to settle earlier than they would have otherwise in order to avoid the duplicate expenses. While it could be argued that the extra preparation helps the attorneys become organized earlier in the litigation, "49 a cost-conscious litigant probably will not appreciate the extra court-ordered preparation. It also is not clear why judges should force attorneys to be prepared for trial before the actual trial date. The imposition of these additional costs is particularly unwarranted when one of the parties has a legitimate reason for litigating the case once the SJT is finished. 5 ' C. Empirical Evidence of the Effects of the SJT: Will It Work?
A large piece of the puzzle that is missing in any analysis of the SJT (and more importantly of the mandatory SJT) is its effectiveness in increasing settlement rates. Proponents of the mandatory SJT often slight the fact that it consumes public resources.' Many SJTs last longer than the "ideal" one-half day proposed by Judge Lambros 5 2 and extend to several days. 5 3 It could be argued that the cost savings from cases that do settle after an SJT would more than offset the extra costs associated with going through an SJT and then a later trial if the case does not settle. Such an argument, however, completely lacks empirical sup-port. 54 Judge Richard Posner has commented on the noticeable lack of empirical data supporting either side of the argument, stating his lack of enthusiasm for the usual "anecdotes, glowing testimonials, confident assertions, [and] appeals to intuition" advanced to support the effectiveness of the SJT. 155 The importance of resolving such arguments accentuates the need for empirical information on the rather complex questions involved.
Some commentators have offered evidence of the effectiveness of SJTs in increasing settlement rates. Judge Lambros, for example, maintains that the use of SJTs has led to a ninety percent settlement rate in the Northern District of Ohio: 5 ' an impressive figure, but most studies show that in fact over ninety percent of all cases settle before trial. 5 7 Thus, Lambros's statistics may stand for the proposition that the SJT does nothing to increase the settlement rate.
In fact, some studies show that pretrial efforts at encouraging settlement usually waste judicial resources. One of the first studies of mandatory pretrial conferences showed that they "reduced the efficiency of the court by consuming judges' time in handling conferences rather than in trying cases."' ' 58 The early studies also showed that cases submitted to mandatory pretrial conference had roughly the same settlement rate as those cases that did not go to mandatory pretrial conference.' 59 This conclusion tends to confirm Judge Posner's fear that the SJT wastes judicial resources because it is too lavish with the judge's time. 160 Judge Posner conducted his own concededly "crude" study of districts in which SJTs are used. He found that there was no support for the conclusion that SJTs increase judicial efficiency."" In sum, if parties reach settlement with equal frequency under mandatory and voluntary settlement conditions, judicial settle- ment management must be an inefficient waste of judicial resources. 1 6 2 In addition, mandatory settlement procedures will cost litigants more than they save in litigation fees. 6 3 The uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of pretrial settlement techniques counsels that they not be imposed against the will of the parties.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when read in conjunction with the comments of the drafters, do not support the use of mandatory SJTs. In addition, the presence of Rule 68 suggests that Congress went only so far in authorizing the application of pressure on litigants to settle their case, but no further. Resort to the "inherent powers of the judiciary" is of little help: the inherent powers have always been construed narrowly and have never been used to allow a court to force a party to consider resolving a dispute in a particular way. Mandatory SJT is also likely to lead to inaccurate results because normal checks in our judicial system, such as the right to crossexamination and other evidentiary rules, are missing from the SJT.
The goal of reducing the strain on the federal judicial system is a laudable one. Judges are expected to cure a backlog of cases that they did nothing to create or aggravate. But reducing the strain on the federal courts should not involve dangerous experimentation with techniques that are unsupported by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and unlikely to be effective in practice.
102 See Menkel-Meadow, 33 UCLA L Rev at 494 (cited in note 25). 163 Id at 512.
